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Abstract (196 words) 
 
Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides a framework that governs the planning 
and preparations for a wide range of potential emergencies.  It requires the engagement and 
co-RSHUDWLRQRIQXPHURXVµSXEOLF¶ERGLHVLQFOXGLQJFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW, local authorities and 
WKH HPHUJHQF\ VHUYLFHV DV ZHOO DV D UDQJH RI µSULYDWH¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQV VXFK DV XWLOLWLHV
companies.  It is apparent that information plays a fundamental role in the Part 1 planning 
provisions and associated guidance.  This article will focus on one specific information-
related provision, namely the duty to maintain plans to warn and inform the public in the 
event of an emergency.  It undertakes detailed analysis of the CCA provisions, secondary 
legislation and extensive government guidance regarding informing the public and related 
media-handling.  It will analyse these measures in light of two competing organisational 
models identified by Walker and Broderick as being present across various CCA 
arrangements.  The tensions between traditionDODXWKRULWDULDQµFRPPDQG¶VWUXFWXUHVRQWKH
one hand, and more flexible, de-centralised arrangements on the other, are particularly 
pronounced in the context of informing the public.  They reflect the challenges of maintaining 
political authority whilst handling and disseminating information that is fluid and in nature 
and evades control.  
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µ.HHS&DOPDQG&DUU\2Q¶,QIRUPLQJWKH3XEOLFXQGHUWKH&LYLO
Contingencies Act 2004 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) provides a framework that governs the 
planning and preparation for a wide range of post-Cold War potential emergencies, including 
terrorist incidents, cyber-attacks and natural hazards such as flooding or extreme weather.1  
The sturdy, reliable planning required by Part 1 CCA has been relatively neglected by 
lawyers, in favour of the potential dystopian dangers of government emergency powers in 
Part 2.  Nevertheless, emergency planning is a global concern that fuels a vast inter-
disciplinary research industry2 and further scrutiny of Part 1 reveals illuminating material 
regarding modern government in the µInformation Age¶. 
 
Across various accounts of emergency planning literature there emerges a basic, recurring 
tension between two broad organisational structures.  The first model, characterised as 
µcommand-and-FRQWURO¶ LV D FHQWUDOLVHG hierarchy directed by a clear single point of 
leadership.  In contrast, the second approach is de-centralised, flexible and locally-situated in 
nature.  The tension between both models is especially pronounced regarding the function 
and organisation of information within the CCA regime.  The role of information dominates 
Part 1, arguably reflecting the PitW 5HYLHZ¶V FODLP that it is µthe lifeblood of effective 
emergency planning¶.3  However, this article will examine just one specific information-
related measure in the CCA, its regulations4 and associated government guidance: provisions 
to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency.  
 
                                                          
1
 These are identified as three of the µWRS-WLHU¶WKUHDWVWR8.+0*RYHUQPHQWA Strong Britain in an Age of 
Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Cm 7953, 2010) p 27.    
2
 See e.g. Ben Wisner, JG Gaillard Ilan Kelman (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk 
Reduction (Routledge 2012). 
3
 The Pitt Review, Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/the
pittreview/final_report.html> accessed 10th November 2013, at 18.1. 
4
 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005, SI 2011/615 (hereinafter referred to 
as CCA(CP)R). 
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This article will start by providing a brief outline of the emergency planning regime, before 
providing an overview of the two alternative models.  It will then look at how these models 
operate in the context of warning and informing the public under the CCA. 
 
Emergency Planning: Overview 
 
To achieve local-level emergency planning across the country the CCA places legal 
obligations on a range of relevant organisations, divided into two groups.  The first group, 
WHUPHGµFDWHJRU\UHVSRQGHUV¶EHFDXVHWKH\IRUPWKe front-line of local emergency services, 
includes local authorities, the police, fire brigade and ambulance services.5   The second 
JURXS WHUPHG µFDWHJRU\  UHVSRQGHUV¶ PD\ DOVR EH KHDYLO\ LQYROYHG LQ VSHFLILF W\SHV RI
emergency and includes private organisations such as utilities companies and transport 
operators.6  7KRXJKWKLVODWWHUJURXS¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQYDULRXVDVSHFWVRIHPHUJHQF\SODQQLQJ
LV UHTXLUHGXQGHU WKH&&$ LWVGXWLHVDUH OHVVRQHURXV WKDQµFDWHJRU\V¶ZKR bear primary 
responsibility for such planning. 7   Within each locality (based on police districts) these 
category 1 and 2 responder groups are required to co-operate,8 share relevant information9 
and participate in a local group caOOHG D µ/RFDO 5HVLOLHQFH )RUXP¶ (LRF).10  This forum 
organises and performs various CCA-prescribed emergency planning activities, though it has 
three main related tasks, all of which are undertaken by its category 1 members.  First, 
drawing on government guidance11 and local expertise,12 the LRF carries out risk assessments 
of potential emergencies that may affect the locality. 13   Second, the forum compiles a 
µ&RPPXQLW\5LVN5HJLVWHU¶14 based on the risk assessments.  This register sets out the various 
potential emergencies, their likelihood and potential impact.  Third, the forum produces a 
range of emergency plans which outline the response arrangements to be followed if 
                                                          
5
 Listed in Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Part 1, Schedule 1. 
6
 Listed ibid Part 3, Schedule 3. 
7
 CCA(CP)R (n 4)  reg 4.  
8
 ibid reg 4(1)-(3). 
9
 ibid reg 4(4)(3). 
10
 ibid regs 4(4)(b), 4(7), 4(9). 
11
 Cabinet Office, Emergency Preparedness (March 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness> accessed 10th November 2013, at 
4.41-4.42, Box 4.4.   
12
 ibid  4.36 ±4.37. 
13
 CCA (n 5) s 2(1)(a); CCA(CP)R reg 13. 
14
 CCA(CP)R (n 4) reg 15.  The current CCR for Northumbria Local Resilience Area can be accessed via: 
<http://www.northumberland.gov.uk/pdf/CRR%207.1%20-%2023%20Apr%202012.pdf> accessed 10th 
November 2103. 
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particular emergencies occur.15  In the event of an emergency local responders use the plans 
to guide their response.  Where an emergency is more serious, select senior members of the 
LRF will IRUP D µ6WUDWHJLF &R-RUGLQDWLQJ *URXS¶ RIWHQ WHUPHG µ*ROG &RPPDQG¶16  This 
group, usually chaired by a senior police representative, provides management and strategic 
leadership to direct the emergency response.17  
 
The CCA supporting regulations and extensive government guidance 18  detail how these 
arrangements should be put into practice, e.g., by prescribing: the methods of planning; the 
format of documents; the procedures for allocating planning tasks to responders and 
information-sharing etc.; standards of µJRRGSUDFWLFH¶DQGmodel protocols.  Though planning 
occurs at a local level, this is overseen by central government; all responders are accountable 
to Ministers for their emergency planning activities 19  and must take account of central 
government guidance in their planning.20  Central government will also become involved 
where an incident escalates; LQDµVLJQLILFDQW¶OHYHO-1 emergency it will provide the leadership 
RI DQ DSSRLQWHG µ/HDG *RYHUQPHQW 'HSDUWPHQW¶ ZLWK H[SHUWLVH LQ WKH UHOHYDQW HPHUJHQF\
area.21  Alternatively, µVHULRXV¶OHYHO-2 emergencies and above will involve the leadership of 
the COBRA Cabinet committee of senior ministers.22 
 
 
[1] Command vs Decentralised Structures 
 
 
The influence of two alternative organisational models, one hierarchical and the other 
decentralised, is apparent across various parts of the CCA.  For example, when discussing 
potential forms of relationship between responder agencies, Walker and Broderick 
                                                          
15
 CCA (n 5) s 2(1)(d).  For an example of an emergency plan, see the flood response plan for the Northumbria 
area, accessible via: <www.northumberland.gov.uk/idoc.ashx?docid=9ea03264-2f6d-4eca-9a48-
d27b97e8163f&version=-1> accessed 10th November 2013 
16
 Cabinet Office, Emergency Response and Recovery (April 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-response-and-recovery>  accessed 1st October 
2013, at 4.2.19-4.2.33; Cabinet Office, Responding to Emergencies, The UK Central Government Response 
(April 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192425/CONOPs_incl_revised_
chapter_24_Apr-13.pdf> accessed 10th November 2013, at 5.3-5.8.     
17
 Emergency Response (n 16) 4.2.23. 
18
 Particularly Emergency Preparedness (n 11) and Emergency Response (n 16). 
19
 CCA (n 5) ss 9(1)-(4). 
20
 CCA(CP)R (n 4)  reg 26. 
21
 Responding to Emergencies (n 16) Section 2. 
22
 ibid, Section 3.    
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distinguish between µa purely hierarchical system in which all is directed or at least 
cascaded from the centre¶ and, alternatively, µa networked or nodal model whereby 
emergency planners coalesce in horizontal, heterarchical partnerships in the co-production 
of security¶,23 the latter being more effective for emergency planning purposes.  This part 
outlines the relevant properties and theoretical justifications/rationales associated with both 
models.24   
 
µ&RPPDQG-and-Control¶ Model 
 
7KH ILUVW PRGHO FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µFRPPDQG-and-FRQWURO¶ assumes authority vested in a 
single individual (or group) who can provide strong, decisive leadership.  It therefore 
involves a distinct hierarchical, top-down linear VWUXFWXUHZKHUHDµFRPPDQGHU¶µFRQWUROV¶WKH
µFRPPDQGHG¶ This model, based on a somewhat authoritarian leadership culture, has been 
particularly cogent in times of crisis or war. 25   Its influence, therefore, in emergency 
planning26 and response at national and local level is to be expected.  The rationale for this 
model is exemplified by Whitty, who claims: 
 
³Emergencies most frequently develop into disasters because of the inadequacies of 
command and control.  Confidence in commanders is established before an incident occurs 
and is dependent upon a number of qualities, the most important of which is leadership´.27 
 
Similarly, noting the importance of strong leadership in emergency response, though in more 
circumspect terms, Twigg refers to µthe history, character and culture of disaster work, with 
                                                          
23
 -LP%URGHULFNDQG&OLYH:DONHUµ$SSO\LQJµ&LYLO3URWHFWLRQ¶$5HYLHZRIWKH&LYLO&RQWLQJHQFLHV5HJLPH
LQWKH8.¶>Reference] p 10-11.  See also Clive Walker and James Broderick, The Civil Contingencies Act 
2004, Risk, Resilience, and the Law in the United Kingdom  (OUP 2006) 17. 
24
 These the two most influential models that  recur across government guidance and literature.  For further 
discussion see Timothy Sellnow and Matthew Seeger, Theorizing Crisis Communications (Wiley-Blackwell 
2013) ch 5, 114-119. 
25
 See, e.g. Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75(HL) p 100 (Lord Reid); Peter Hennessy, The Prime 
Minister, The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (Penguin, London, 2001) 103. 
26
 The Buncefield Incident 11 December 2005, The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board, 
Volume 1 <http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/> accessed 10th November 2013, at [153]. 
27
 Garth Whitty in Joint Committee on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, Draft Civil Contingencies Bill (HL 
184, HC 1074 2002-3) Annex 7, 108-9. 
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its command and control mentality, blue-print planning, technocratic bias and disregard for 
vulnerable FRPPXQLWLHV¶NQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHUWLVH¶28 
 
Command-and-control features are apparent across the CCA regime.  7KHPRGHO¶VLQIOXHQFH
is particularly marked in Part 2 of the Act which confers emergency powers on ministers, but 
also in Part 1 regulations that allow ministers to issue orders or urgent directions that 
category 1 responders must perform.29  Such tendencies also LQIOXHQFHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶V
ongoing desire to maintain its traditional monopoly regarding national security-related 
information.30  Further hegemonic tendencies are evident LQWKH$FW¶VGLVSDUDWHDOORFDWLRQRI
legal duties between central government and local responders; this results in µERWWRP-KHDY\¶
responsibilities and a lack of higher accountability. 31   Yet, as guidance indicates, there 
remains µa public expectation that [government]  will give a strong lead at a time of crisis, 
take charge of events and manage situations¶32   
 
The centrality of the command-and-control model in emergency response closely reflects 
traditional demands for a strong protective leader in times of crisis or disaster.  This model is 
very much epitomised E\7KRPDV+REEHV¶Leviathan, written during the chaos of civil war.33  
This background climate clearly influenced +REEHV¶ account of the lawless µVWDWHRIQDWXUH¶
as chaotic, disordered, and uncertain, filled with conflict, µFRQWLQXDOO IHDUH DQG GDQJHU RI
YLROHQWGHDWK¶;34 a hypothetical disaster zone of sorts.  Hobbes¶VRFLDOFRQWUDFW advocates the 
creation of a strong, powerful sovereign monarch whose command can maintain peace, order 
and individual security. 35   In doing so, this patriarchal monarch must be given the 
unconditional obedience of the populace.36   +REEHV¶ grand narrative legitimises modern 
liberal nation states, yet it is also, as critics have suggested, a model ultimately grounded in 
                                                          
28
 John Twigg µDisaster Risk Reduction, Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency 
3URJUDPPLQJ¶ <http://www.odihpn.org/hpn-resources/good-practice-reviews/disaster-risk-reduction-
mitigation-and-preparedness-in-aid-programming> accessed 10th November 2013, at 118. 
29
 CCA(CP)R (n 4) regs 5, 7. 
30
 Applying Civil Protection (n 23) 12; Pitt Review (n 3) ES.96. 
31
 Draft Civil Contingencies Bill (n 27) [101]; Risk Resilience & the Law (n 23) 243; Clive Walker, 
µ*RYHUQDQFH RI&ULWLFDO1DWLRQDO,QIUDVWUXFWXUH¶>@3/ 
32
 Cabinet Office, Communicating Risk (January 2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/communicating-risk-guidance> accessed 10th November 2013, 
at 52. 
33
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651, Penguin 1985) 
34
 ibid, 183-188. 
35
 ibid 192. 
36
 ibid 227. 
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fear. 37   Such dynamics are arguably implicit in modern approaches to emergency 
management where government policies are buttressed by rhetoric that, for example, terms 
the present era WKHµDJH RIXQFHUWDLQW\¶.38  Yet, as modern theorists explain, this uncertainty is 
µPDQXIDFWXUHG¶DSDUDGR[LFDO DQGLQHVFDSDEOHµconsequence of scientific and political efforts 
to control or manage (earlier) [risks] ¶39  That the four main threats identified in the 8.¶V 
National Security Strategy are primarily man-made tends to support this. 
 
Decentralised model 
 
7KHµGHFHQWUDOLVHG¶PRGHOLQHmergency planning represents contrasting characteristics to the 
command model.  This form of arrangement is less formally structured and more flexible.  It 
does not situate authority at a single point issuing top-down commands, but is instead non-
hierarchical and works at local, ground-level.  It entails people working in a horizontal 
network-type arrangement in a collaborative, co-operative and democratic culture.40  This 
model is most influential LQWKH&&$UHJLPH¶VVWURQJHPSKDVLVRQco-operation between local 
responders 41  and provisions to facilitate information-sharing. 42   Walker and Broderick 
identify these measures as decentralised in nature, and claim that in making institutional 
arrangements to attain resilience, 
 
³the late modern state is being forced to adopt styles of governance intended to achieve 
influence in complex horizontal (or heterarchical), decentred and networked relationships, 
with an emphasis on shared knowledge and consensus´43   
 
This comment indicates that the decentralised model is not necessarily compatible with the 
pre-existing culture or dynamic of the state in emergency management mode (which arguably 
more comfortably fits with the command model).  It implies that this decentralised model is 
not the preferred or natural choice, but is nonetheless necessary for emergency management.  
                                                          
37
 3LHUUH6FKODJµ7KH(PSW\&LUFOHVRI/LEHUDO-XVWLILFDWLRQ¶0LFK/5HY-7;Jacques Derrida, 
The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1 (University of Chicago Press 2009) 39-40.  For a discussion of fear in 
WKHFRQWH[WRIGLVDVWHUV VHH)UDQN)XUHGL µ1HZ'LPHQVLRQV7KH*URZWKRID0DUNHW LQ)HDU¶ LQ+DYLGDQ
Rodriguez, Enrico Quarantelli and Russell Dynes (eds) Handbook of Disaster Research (Springer 2006). 
38
 A term repeatedly used in National Security Strategy (n 1). 
39
 Ulrich Beck µ3ROLWLFVRI5LVN6RFLHW\¶ LQ -DQH)UDQNOLQ HG The Politics of Risk Society (Polity 1998) 12; 
Anthony Giddensµ5LVN6RFLHW\WKH&RQWH[WRI%ULWLVK3ROLWLFV¶LQibid 28.  
40
 Sellnow and Seeger (n 24) 117-119. 
41
 CCA(CP)R (n 4) reg 4(1)-(3). 
42
 ibid regs 44A, 47-50. 
43
 Emphasis added.  Applying Civil Protection (n 23) 3. 
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One crucial underlying reason for this is arguably the nature of information that constitutes 
the very µOLIHEORRG¶RIWKHV\VWHP 
 
The decentralised model is broadly reflective of, and more compatible with, the nature of 
information itself.  :LWK WKHHPHUJHQFHRIZKDW VRPHFRPPHQWDWRUV WHUP WKH µ,QIRUPDWLRQ
6RFLHW\¶ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH µ5LVN 6RFLHW\¶44 there have emerged theories exploring the nature 
and properties of information, particularly in light of technological developments.  In this 
context, three related features of information are significant.  First, information is intangible, 
incorporeal and cannot be understood as a physical thing.45  Digitisation replaces physical 
information-storage with a µFRPSOH[± and highly liquid ± pattern of ones and zeroes¶46  This 
view of information, or rather its movements, as being liquid in character is also evident in 
FRPPRQ DFFRXQWV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ µIORZV¶47 and µOHDNV¶  3LWW¶V GHSLFWLRQ of information as 
µOLIHEORRG¶ VLPLODUO\ GUDZV XSRQ D PHWDSKRU RI OLTXLGLW\ 48   Second, as Lash argues, 
information acts to compress time as it travels distances rapidly, allowing real-time 
communication.49  For Lash, 
 
³The primary qualities of information are flow, disembededness, spatial compression, 
temporal compression, real-time relations.  It is not exclusively, but mainly, in this sense that 
we live in an information age.´50 
 
Though rapid transmission is a clear consequence of advancements in digital technology, 
Lash explains that this is a continuation of trends that started with the emergence of the mass 
media in earlier times.51  Third, information works in a non-linear and disjointed way, which 
Lash refers to as µa quasi-anarchy of information proliferation and flows¶.52  It works via a 
range of networks (at individual level, but with global reach) which play a crucial role in the 
                                                          
44
 Scott Lash, Critique of Information (Sage 2002) 1.     
45
 John Perry Barlow, µ7KH Economy of Ideas 6HOOLQJ :LQH :LWKRXW %RWWOHV RQ WKH *OREDO 1HW¶
<https://homes.eff.org/~barlow/EconomyOfIdeas.html > accessed 10th October 2013. 
46
 ibid. 
47
 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Wiley-Blackwell 2010) ch 6, 500; Emergency Response (n 
47) 4.4.22, 8.3.3.  
48Zygmunt %DXPDQSURSRVHVµIOXLGLW\¶DVµWKHOHDGLQJPHWDSKRUIRUWKHpresent stage of the modern era¶: Liquid 
Modernity (Polity 2000) 2. 
49
 Lash (n 44) 3, 18-21. 
50
 ibid  2, 18-20; Castells (n 47) xxxi-xxxii, ch 7. 
51
 Lash (n 44) 73-5. 
52
 ibid  4. 
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Information Society.53  Lash claims that technology stretches and breaks the linear bonds 
associated with the nation VWDWH  %XW WKHVH ERQGV DUH µUHFRQVWLWXWH>G@ DV WKH OLQNV RI QRQ-
OLQHDUDQGGLVFRQWLQXRXVQHWZRUNV¶54He also notes the decline of traditional organisations55 
iQWR µGLVRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ WKDW µDUHSHUKDSV OHss hierarchical than horizontal¶,56 and more fluid, 
mobile57 and reflexive.58  Such developments raise questions about the standing of the nation 
state59 and power more generally.60  Because µInformation wants to be free¶61 it poses major 
challenges for those who wish to tightly control or monopolise it in the Information Age. 
 
Summary 
 
Both models reflect alternative, even opposing, properties that may be necessary for 
emergency planning and response.  There is a long-established tradition of the need for clear, 
decisive leadership in an emergency.  Yet in our technologically complex µ,QIRUPDWLRQ
SocLHW\¶ any information-reliant endeavour, such as emergency preparation and response, 
must be arranged to enable information to be handled effectively, and must therefore 
understand its nature.  How do these conflicting models, and the values they represent, 
operate in the context of warning and informing the public? 
 
 
[2] Warning and Informing the Public 
 
 
*RYHUQPHQW JXLGDQFH VWDWHV WKDW µCommunicating with the public is an integral part of 
preparing for and responding to incidents and cannot be done in isolation¶62 and furthermore   
µGood public communication is vital to the successful handling of any emergency and should 
be incorporated in all contingency planning¶63  So as part the general duty to assess and plan 
                                                          
53
 ibid  20, 26; Castells (n 47) xviii-xxvii, 501. 
54
 Lash (n 44) 20. 
55
 ibid 39. 
56
 ibid 40. 
57
 ibid 41. 
58
 ibid 42. 
59
 ibid 35. 
60
 ibid  xi, 25. 
61
 Brand quoted by Barlow (n 45). 
62
 Emergency Preparedness (n 11) 7.31. 
63
 Emphasis added.  Emergency Response (n 16) 8.1.1.  See also ibid 7.4.2. 
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for emergencies,64 category 1 responders PXVW µmaintain arrangements to warn the public, 
and to provide information and advice to the public, if an emergency is likely to occur or has 
occurred¶65  Guidance divides this duty into two specific functions.  First, it requires those 
responders to inform the public about the risk of emergencies in their locality by undertaking 
ongoing awareness-raising, education and community engagement.66   Second, it requires 
responders to have plans in place to warn and advise the public in case an emergency actually 
arises, encompassing e.g. evacuation alerts and practical advice about what action to take.  
Though the two functions are related, the second aspect of the duty is the focus of this article.  
This second aspect of warning the public must be covered by emergency plans67 and, in turn, 
responders must follow µUHJDUG¶ WKHse plans when advising the public in an emergency.68  
This ensures that a pre-prepared communications strategy, covering before, during and after 
an emergency,69 LVµIXOO\LQWHJUDWHG¶LQWRHPHUJHQF\SODQV70  
 
Guidance divides the public into three broad groups, each with different informational needs: 
first, those directly involved in the emergency; second, local people and/or relatives of those 
directly involved; and third, the wider public and news media.71  Guidance also highlights the 
needs of vulnerable groups within the public, such as the elderly, those with mobility issues 
or non-English-speaking groups.72  However, across various groups, the basic rationale for 
WKHµSXEOLFDGYLFH¶GXW\LVµthe belief that a well-informed public is better able to respond to 
an emergency and to minimise the impact of the emergency on the community¶73  So better 
public information will enable people to make better decisions, and is therefore 
empowering.74  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64
 CCA (n 5) s 2. 
65
 ibid s 2(1)(g). 
66
 Emergency Preparedness (n 11) 7.1, 7.6-7.7, 7.38-7.40; Emergency Response (n 16) 8.3.1.    
67
 CCA (n 5) s 2(1)(g); CCA(CP)R (n 4) reg 20.   
68
 CCA(CP)R (n 4) reg 28.   
69
 Emergency Preparedness (n 11) 7.35. 
70
 ibid 7.26.   
71
 ibid 7.105. 
72
 ibid [para].  
73
 Emergency Preparedness (n 11) 7.6. 
74
 Cabinet Office, Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders (April 
2009)   <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/expectations-and-indicators-of-good-practice-set-for-
category-1-and-2-responders> accessed 1st October 2013, at 27.   
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CCA Arrangements: Overview 
Under the CCA, category 1 responders must co-operate to appoint one of their number as 
having lead responsibility for maintaining and implementing plans to inform the public in the 
event of an emergency.75  Public information plans may cover general matters such as the 
generic DGYLFH WR µJR LQ VWD\ LQ WXQH LQ¶76 deployable in various emergencies, or relate to 
more specific emergencies, e.g. instructions to evacuate a particular area such as a city 
centre.77  7KHOHDGµPXVW¶EHDEOHto FROODERUDWHZLWKRWKHUFDWHJRU\UHVSRQGHUVDQGµPXVW¶
inform them of its actions (and proposed actions) to inform the public;78 WKH\LQWXUQµPXVW¶
regularly consult with the lead on these matters. 79   Collaboration, partnership and 
information-sharing between category 1 responders is µWKH FULWLFDO HOHPHQW LQ WKH HIIHFWLYH
GHOLYHU\RILQIRUPDWLRQWRWKHSXEOLF¶80 and protocols can be used to help achieve this.81  
 
Guidance sets out more detailed arrangements for informing the public in the event of an 
emergency, with particular emphasis on managing media interest in an emergency. 82   It 
confirms that responder information should be co-ordinated from the outset of an 
emergency.83  This might entail arrangements such as a shared media brief, a central press 
office and the involvement of a media liaison officer.84  As the emergency develops this may 
be headed up by an experienced media communications specialist.85  Where Gold Command 
LV LQYROYHG LQGLUHFWLQJDQHPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVH LW WRRPXVW µLPSOHPHQWPHGLD-handling and 
SXEOLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQVSODQV¶86 though this can be delegated.  Gold Command will also be 
supported and advised by a PHGLDFRPPXQLFDWLRQVµFHOO¶87  These arrangements ensure that 
responsibilities are clearly allocated, preferably in advance, to enable senior personnel to 
provide clear leadership in informing the public. 
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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 ibid 8.5.3-8.5.5. 
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 ibid 4.2.23, 4.2.25. 
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Central government occupies a background role at planning stage; the Cabinet Office issues 
national guidance on informing the public for responders to follow.  The Cabinet Office is in 
turn advised by an independent committee whose stated objectives are to improve warning 
mechanisms, and to ensure public information is timely and effective.88  Where an emergency 
becomes national in scale, central government will become involved in managing information 
to the public.89  A News Co-ordination Centre can be set up at national level.90  Government 
ZLOO µVXSSRUW DQG FRPSOHPHQW¶ ORFDO UHVSRQGHUV¶ HIIRUWs by undertaking various activities, 
LQFOXGLQJ µGHWHUPLQLQJ WKH SXEOLF LQIRrmation strategy and co-ordinating public advice in 
FRQVXOWDWLRQZLWK>*ROG&RPPDQG@¶91 
 
Maintaining authority in an emergency 
 
The concern of CCA guidance in fostering clear, hierarchical leadership in emergency 
handling extends to communicating with the public.  The reason for this is arguably the CCA 
regime¶V focus on the needs and response of the public, or specific groups within the public.92  
Overall, the regulations stress the importance of avoiding unnecessary panic.  They state that 
category 1 responders µmust have regard to the importance of not alarming the public 
XQQHFHVVDULO\¶ ZKHQ SXEOLVKLQJ HPHUJHQF\ SODQV93 and when maintaining arrangements to 
warn and advise the public in an emergency.94  Related to this, guidance indicates a recurring 
concern with maintaining public confidence in an emergency.  The National Risk Register 
recognises that most emergencies will have a psychological impact upon the public 
affected.95   The purpose of providing information in such circumstances is for practical 
                                                          
88
 National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public,  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/national-steering-committee-on-warning-informing-
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 Emergency Response (n 16) ch 13.   
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accessed 10th November 2012, at 1.16. 
13 
 
guidance and vital reassurance, 96  though it is widely acknowledged that panic and the 
EUHDNGRZQRIVRFLDORUGHUDUHµGLVDVWHUP\WKV¶.97   
 
One method of fostering public calm and confidence is via a reassuring authority figure.  This 
will be particularly vital to those directly involved in the emergency.98  Yet guidance suggests 
that this should also be planned for those in the vicinity of an emergency EHFDXVH µthe 
PDMRULW\ RI SHRSOH QHHG OHDGHUVKLS DQG GLUHFWLRQ VRPH QHHG WR EH FRQWUROOHG  « WKH
majority of individuals are likely to need some level of support¶99  More broadly, there is a 
concern not just to have clear command structures in place, but to ensure that leadership is 
also visible to the public.  For example, Emergency Preparedness recommends that trained 
VSRNHVSHUVRQVZLOOEHPRUHHIIHFWLYHµif ...already recognised as a trustworthy authoritative 
person,¶, for example µbecause they already have a good public profile in the area or are in 
uniform (research shows that the public have great confidence in spokespeople from the 
emergency services)¶100  This emphasis on the uniform as a powerful visual indicator reflects 
guidance advising authorities to make use of images.101  Similarly, the Pitt Review into the 
IORRGVDFURVV(QJODQGIRXQGWKDWLQDUHDVZKHUHµ*ROG&RPPDQG¶ZDVXVHGWKHUH was 
more visible leadership and better involvement of media which helped essential information 
to reach the public.102  Pitt also noted the value of local leaders with a high media profile who 
provided reassurance to the public and used the media to communicate advice.103  So strong 
leadership in emergencies is insufficient per se; it must also effectively project itself when 
communicating with the public.  The aim is to maintain authority and the appearance of 
authority in order to foster public trust and reassurance. 
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100
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Authoritative information in an emergency 
 
The maintenance of responder authority is partially reliant upon its capacity to provide 
information that is itself authoritative; µThe flow of authoritative information «XQGHUSLQVWKH
resilience of a community to disruptive challenges¶.104  Thus CCA guidance affords much 
attention to ensuring that information, particularly that provided to the public, is 
µauthoritative¶ DQG FUHGLEOH105   A useful starting point for such examination is the core 
objective of public communications in an emergency:   
 
³When an emergency occurs, the key communications objective will be to deliver accurate, 
clear and timely information and advice to public so they feel confident, safe and well 
informed´106 
 
To foster public confidence the information it is provided must be clear, accurate and 
provided quickly.  Rapid dissemination will be particularly essential for early alerts or 
warnings of sudden emergencies which must µUHDFKDVPDQ\SHRSOHDVSRVVLEOHDVTXLFNO\DV
SRVVLEOH¶107  But beyond this, government guidance suggests that in the first hour of an 
emergency the public needs information regarding the basic details of the incident, health 
implications, practical advice (e.g. what to do, where to go) and reassurance if necessary.108  
Next, clarity requires any technical information, e.g. scientific guidance regarding the health 
or environmental implications of a particular emergency, to be communicated in terms that 
people can understand.109  But most importantly, it requires a unified and consistent message 
to the public and the importance of this is repeatedly stressed in guidance.110  Appointing a 
lead responder to inform the public assists in this aim by avoiding unnecessary duplication of 
information and conflicting messages. 111   The ideal is respoQGHUV µVSHDNLQJ ZLWK RQH
YRLFH¶, 112  and this is especially important regarding emergency warning systems, e.g. 
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evacuations.113  Finally, information to the public must be accurate.114  Factually correct 
information is vital to ensure the public is adequately informed about the situation so they can 
make informed decisions,115 and in this sense contributes to public empowerment.116   
 
Information must also be effectively disseminated and guidance VWDWHV WKDW µThe key to 
effective communication with public is getting the message right for the right audience¶.117  
2QHNH\ZD\LQZKLFKWKH&&$UHJLPHVHHNVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHµULJKWPHVVDJH¶UHDFKHVWKH
µULJKWDXGLHQFH¶LVE\XWLOLVLQJWKHPHGLD, particularly local radio and television, as a means of 
dissemination.  Though media organisations are not afforded Category 2 responder status, 
they do have a µSXEOLF VHUYLFH¶ UROHRU µGXW\¶ LQ WKHHYHQWRI DQ HPHUJHQF\118  During the 
2007 floods the media, particularly local radio, undertook this role by providing information 
and updates about the flood.119  Guidance confirms that in the event of an emergency the 
media can deliver information to large numbers of people and it is often the quickest most 
effective means of delivery.120  So in emergency situations media organisations, particularly 
television and radio, may undertake a key µFRQGXLW¶ function,121 channelling vital messages 
from responders to the wider public.  For this reason CCA guidance states that media 
organisations have a key role to play and should be encouraged to participate in LRFs and 
planning.122  It also advises ongoing liaison and contact-building with media representatives 
so that parties can work together effectively in the event of an emergency.123   
 
Summary 
 
Overall, authority (actual or perceived) partly rests on having command of information.  The 
ideal set out by government guidance is fast, clear authoritative information issued from a 
single, credible official source and disseminDWHGZLGHO\YLDDFRQGXLWPHGLDRU LQ7ZLJJ¶V
                                                          
113
 Juan Carlos Villagran de Leon, µ(DUO\:DUQLQJ3ULQFLSOHVDQG6\VWHPV¶LQWisner et al (n 2) 486.    
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terms, µLQIRUPDWLRQFRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO¶124   Discussing warning systems, Sorensen claims 
WKDWWKRXJKWKLVµlinear¶ communications model, which µassumes a top-GRZQIORZRIµRIILFLDO¶
warning information WRWKHSXEOLF¶LVµQRWZLWKRXWPHULW¶LWµneeds to be revised¶LQOLJKWRI
social and technological changes.125  So how viable is µLQIRUPDWLRQFRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO¶ in 
light of shifts in technology and culture? 
 
 
[3] µ&RPPDQG-and-Control¶ of Information: An Uncertain 
Future 
 
 
As previous emergencies highlight, there are recurring problems achieving the objective of 
fast, clear, accurate information.  The decentralised, fluid nature of information means that 
the ideal model of a clear authoritative voice is difficult to sustain in the reality of an 
emergency.   
 
The implications of failure to provide fast, consistent and accurate information in an 
emergency were starkly illustrated in the London bombings of July 7th 2005 (7/7).  Though 
the 7/7 Review Committee Report found that the emergency response had been excellent in 
many respects, there were recurring flaws with communications between responders and to 
the wider public.  For example, newspapers obtained information about the London 
Underground explosions within minutes of the first bombing. 126   However, official 
confirmation of the explosions was not provided until approximately two hours after the first 
bomb.127  Official LQIRUPDWLRQLQLWLDOO\FRQILUPHGLQFRUUHFWO\WKDWWKHUHKDGEHHQDµSRZHU
VXUJH¶RQ7XEH128 and was quickly overtaken by media coverage.  As a result, news editors 
confirmed that the credibility of official information came into question.129  The committee 
found that the gap between known information and police confirmations can result in a loss 
                                                          
124
 Twigg (n 28) 314.  
125
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of credibility and appear secretive. 130   Furthermore the committee found that basic 
information and advice on 7/7 should have been provided to the public sooner,131 within 1 
hour.132  The public information provided in the aftermath lacked practical instructions for 
people to follow, and some messages were contradictory.133  7KH µJR LQ VWD\ LQ WXQH LQ¶
message was disseminated for longer than necessary and this caused public confusion.134  
Subsequent incidents have also highlighted problems with timely dissemination of public 
information135 and clarity of message.136 
 
The provision of fast, clear and accurate information is not readily achievable in emergency 
circumstances.  Establishing an accurate account of factual events on the ground is often 
intensely difficult in the confusion and uncertainty of a rapidly developing emergency 
situation.137  Furthermore, the ideal may be frustrated by conflicts between these standards, 
e.g. between accuracy and speed.138  Finally, information will be produced and disseminated 
by other bodies, particularly the media, that potentially undercuts and/or competes with the 
single, authoritative voice of responders.139  $V7ZLJJFODLPVµin an age where people have 
access to more and more sources of information ± in the media and in the internet ± [the]  
controlling and centralising of information supply is no longer feasible¶140  It is to these 
alternative sources of information that discussion now turns. 
 
The media as an alternative source of information 
 
CCA guidance provides detailed coverage of media handling as part of the public warning 
duty.141  Because the media largely shapes the public¶VSHUFHSWLRQ of an emergency142 it will 
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also influence the emergency response.143  Emergency Preparedness therefore indicates that 
media management FDQEHFDWHJRULVHGDVµRWKHUDFWLRQLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKDQHPHUJHQF\¶DQG
that emergency plans should cover such matters.144 
 
As well as the public servicHµFRQGXLW¶ IXQFWLRQ, during an emergency the various forms of 
media will also undertake their usual reportage and, where necessary, the µZDWFKGRJ¶
function of holding officials to account.145  7KXV WKH\ DUH ERWK µYLWDO DOOLHV¶ DQG µSRWHQWLDO
DGYHUVDULHV¶.146  Guidance recognises that WKHPHGLD¶VHPHUJHQF\UHSRUWDJHwill be concerned 
with the performance of WKH UHVSRQGHUV µthe handling of the emergency, as well as the 
emergency itself, will all be part of the story¶147  It advises category 1 responders to plan 
ahead to deal with potential criticism and to DYRLG µinconsistencies in presentation or 
PHVVDJH¶148  7KHPHGLD¶VUHSRUWDJHUROHDOVRfrequently involves relaying the experiences of 
individuals involved in or affected by the emergency.  By doing so the media may provide a 
platform for alternative narratives of the incident.149  These may compete with the rHVSRQGHUV¶
singular message, particularly if there are varying perceptions regarding the efficacy of the 
response.150   
 
Guidance indicates a clear concern to retain a degree of influence over the media coverage of 
the emergency, to ensure that the official narrative dominates.  It draws a distinction between 
RIILFLDODQGXQRIILFLDORULQIRUPDOLQIRUPDWLRQµIt is important to be aware that information 
can be generated by official or unofficial sources¶151  Failure to provide official information 
to the media will lead them to informal or alternative sources.152  µThis may lead to a loss of 
PHVVDJLQJ FRQWURO « DQG SXW >UHVSRQGHUV@ LQ D SRVLWLRQ RI KDYLQJ WR GHIHQG WKHPVHOYHV
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against unfounded criticism or inaccurate analysis¶ 153   The assumption that unofficial 
information will be inaccurate and/or critical is present elsewhere in guidance.154  As well as 
effective management of the media agenda, guidance also stresses the importance of retaining 
ownership (and perceived ownership) of official information. 155   Yet, despite the 
preoccupation with such matters, media reportage may actually provide valuable information 
that potentially assists the emergency response.  For example, the media helped to highlight 
the µKLJKO\ LQDGHTXDWH¶ response in crisis leadership during Hurricane Katrina. 156  
Additionally, aFFRUGLQJ WR JXLGDQFH WKH PHGLD¶V UHDO-time reportage, which will include 
individual experiences and/or analysis of the emergency response, LVµan important source of 
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ that will be fed back to Gold Command157 and presumably may be used as a 
basis for further action.  
 
In short, responders need the media (as a conduit to the public and as a source of intelligence) 
but simultaneously compete with the media (in reportage mode) where we see a struggle for 
narrative control and informational authority.  The clear, authoritative voice of responders 
becomes potentially just one among many.   
 
The impact of new technologies and media 
 
The emergence of digital technologies, particularly mobile phones and web-based media such 
as social networking sites (SNS) like Facebook and Twitter raises further challenges (as well 
as opportunities) regarding informing the public in emergencies.  Government guidance does 
recognise the potential uses of social media in emergency communications with the public.  
Though it outlines certain risks with the medium,158 it suggests that LRFs might consider 
producing social media protocols.159  The volume of SNS-related guidance has gradually 
increased,160 arguably reflecting official recognition of its social significance. 
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As demonstrated in the 2004 Asian tsunami, new technologies enable the global 
dissemination of ground-level information in real-time.  Emergency Preparedness states,  
 
³Mobile phones with cameras and other similar devices mean that the public are able to 
publish their own content.  Within seconds of a disaster, pictures can be broadcast around 
the world, sometimes before the emergency services have had a chance to respond´161   
 
This user-generated content (UGC) provides material for traditional media organisations162 
whilst also competing with them,163 adding \HWPRUHµYRLFHV¶ to the plethora, and ultimately 
increasing pressure on responders to provide timely information.164  Yet this aspect of new 
technology is also particularly valuable to responders because UGC provides potentially vital 
intelligence during an emergency.  Rather than linear, bottom-down communication, social 
media sites provide live two-way communications; they enable information to be 
communicated to the public, 165  but also information from members of the public to be 
gathered.166  Yet they also crucially facilitate communications between the members of the 
public.167  Guidance VWDWHV WKDW µAQDO\VLV RI VRFLDO PHGLD FDQ « aid situational awareness 
and better understanding of the working context¶,168 and indeed SNS have been utilised by 
Australian responders to assist flood response.169  For this reason guidance states that social 
media does potentially play a role in emergency preparation and response.170  Furthermore, it 
LVµan area that emergency responders cannot ignore; ZKLOVWKDYLQJOLWWOHFRQWURORYHULW¶171  
Consistent with this, recent research confirms that SNS adjust the traditional dynamic 
EHWZHHQµFRPPDQGHU¶DQGWKHµFRPPDQGHG¶SXEOLF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³[They] present a disruptive technological challenge to the assumption of publics as passive 
recipients and consumers of one directional emergency broadcasts through traditional 
medial channels (e.g. radio and television)´172  
 
Despite limitations,173  such technology is empowering and µWKH FLWL]HQ « is recast from 
passive recipient to potential searcher, creator or collator of FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶174 
 
These developments exacerbate the difficulty responders face in dominating the wider 
coverage of an emergency, and aptly highlight the great disparity between the command-
model and the decentralised, fluid means by which information operates.  The disparity was 
recognised by Exercise Watermark which found: 
 
 ³The speed of social media means that some command and control structures are not flexible 
enough or fast enough to respond to public questions and this can undermine the authority of 
UHVSRQGHUVDQGWKHSXEOLF¶VWUXVW´175  
 
Such challenges are not restricted to informing the public in emergencies and indeed arise in 
other areas of law that involve ineffective attempts to control information, particularly in the 
digital domain, e.g. privacy injunctions 176  and enforcing copyright to prevent illegal 
downloads.177   
 
All RI WKLV LQGLFDWHV WKDW DV 7ZLJJ VWDWHV µcommand and control of information is [now] 
unrealistic.  The public are increasingly consumers of information from different sources, 
choosing what information to use and where to obtain it.¶178  As a result, Twigg argues that 
emergency planners will have to move away from command-and-control communicative 
approaches to alternatives that recognise these developments.179  ,QVKRUWµpublic information 
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DQGSODQQLQJQHHGVWREHFRPHLQWHUDFWLYHG\QDPLFDQGUHVSRQVLYH¶,180 or we might even say 
reflexive. 
  
 
Conclusion  
 
 
Though clear, decisive leadership is an important aspect of an effective emergency response 
(alongside co-operation and flexibility), a command-and-control approach to information 
management in emergencies is increasingly outmoded and unviable, particularly in light of 
the potentially democratising forces of new technology.  Information dissemination in 
emergencies does not follow a basic top-down, linear model; instead the flow of information 
is more complex and reciprocal, fluid and evasive.  Government guidance does on occasion 
acknowledge this, e.g. by claiming that the monitoring of media and SNS can yield valuable 
intelligence for responders.  Thus it becomes apparent that the authorities provide 
information to the media and public, the media provides information to the public and 
authorities and, finally the public provides information to the media and authorities.  This 
circulating information is used by all parties as a basis for action, therefore producing more 
information, which is used in turn as a basis for further (or modified) action.   
 
Yet elsewhere government guidance reveals the ongoing tendency to cling onto an 
informational hegemony.  For example, despite accepting that the media and SNS may 
provide useful information, elsewhere guidance indicates an underlying assumption that such 
information will be false or critical and the best way to minimise this risk is to tactically feed 
information and manage media (old and new) so that the official narrative dominates.  This is 
arguably justified at the height of an emergency where (e.g.) responders need people to take 
specific actions.  But beyond this, government needs WRJUDVSWKDWWKHµRIILFLDO¶QDUUDWLYHRI
events is not the only, or indeed the correct, one.  Sometimes the authorities get it wrong, and 
sometimes official information about a crisis is not the only truth.   
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Government guidance on informing the public reveals an ongoing preoccupation with 
maintaining institutional authority (local or national) as much as empowering the public.  
Unlike in other forums, 181  µRIILFLDO¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ LV QRW DOZD\V automatically revered as 
definitive by the public and, arguably, nor should it be.  Instead, informational authority must 
be earned.  The concern to provide authoritative information is at least partially linked to the 
(actual or perceived) authority182 that this fosters, though such authority is ostensibly required 
to assist an effective response.  So, ultimately, though government guidance advises 
engagement with new technologies and recognises the fluid UHDOLWLHV RI WKH µ,QIRUPDWLRQ
6RFLHW\¶, its implicit aim is still command-and-control of information of sorts, albeit by more 
sophisticated, complex means. 
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